In the face of escalating costs, declining productivity, and constraints on funding for public transit, many governments have turned to transit privatization in an eff ort to improve cost effi ciency. Privatization of bus services occurs in a range of forms and regulatory environments. Privatization proponents argue that publicly owned and subsidized transit operations are ineffi cient due to higher labor costs, restrictive work rules, and large bureaucracies. Critics of privatization argue that several market failures counteract these theorized benefi ts, resulting in under-insurance, substandard vehicle maintenance, and higher levels of pollution, congestion, and accident rates, among other inadequacies. This paper reviews the research and debates on privatization in the form of contracting, including its eff ects on cost-effi ciency, quality of transit provision, and labor.
Introduction
Public transit has been increasingly viewed as important to achieving the environmental and social objectives of sustainable transport in the U.S. However, in the face of escalating costs, declining productivity, and constraints on funding for public transit, many national governments have turned to transit privatization in an eff ort to improve cost effi ciency. For example, under Margaret Thatcher's privatization agenda, Great Britain deregulated much of their transit system in 1985, eliminating much of the controls on market entry and exit throughout the country. Similarly, Santiago, Chile, completely liberalized its transit system, allowing free entry in 1979, followed by fare and route deregulation a few years later. In the 1980s, rising costs in the U.S. public transit sector prompted the Reagan administration to substantially cut subsidies and promote contracting of bus services.
Privatization of bus services occurs in a range of forms and regulatory environments. In deregulated bus markets, governments eliminate many of the controls on market entry and exit, allowing private bus operators to compete along fi xed routes and semi-fi xed routes (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993) . The degree of liberalization schemes vary from complete free-entry to regulations of fares, entry, routing, and vehicle standards. In many countries, governments provide exclusive franchises along routes to private operators based on a competitive bidding process. With contracting of public transit, the public agency coordinates schedules, routes, and fares to overcome the problem of multiple providers, while the private operator owns and maintains vehicles and hires drivers. This arrangement allows public control while reducing operating costs and is more common in developed countries. Finally, privately operated small-scale vehicles, or paratransit, operating along semi-fi xed routes are found in a range of regulatory environments, sometimes operating informally or legally as a complement to the formal system such as dial-a-ride services for the disabled or airport shutt le services.
Privatization proponents argue that publicly owned and subsidized transit operations are ineffi cient due to higher labor costs, restrictive work rules, and large bureaucracies. The profi t motive and competition in the private market is theorized to lower costs and improve the quality of services. It is also argued that increased competition in bus transit fosters more innovative services that are more competitive with the private automobile, bringing signifi cant benefi ts to travelers at a much lower cost. Further, the free-entry of fi rms is theorized to not only increase mobility and transportation choices, but also to push public sector bus companies to improve their operations, cut costs, and increase productivity.
However, critics of privatization argue that several market failures counteract these theorized benefi ts. For example, cost-cutt ing behavior by transit companies oft en results in under-insurance; substandard vehicle maintenance; higher levels of pollution, congestion, and accident rates; as well as inadequate coordination and integration of routes and fares. In deregulated and informal markets, fi erce on-road competition between buses and over-entry of bus fi rms along profi table routes can lead to signifi cant increases in congestion and accidents. Conversely, private transit operators may leave the less profi table routes underserved. The lower wages and benefi ts paid by private bus companies has oft en resulted in higher labor turnover, less qualifi ed drivers, and lower productivity, leading in turn to declines in the safety and quality of service, prompting critics to charge that cost savings are resource transfers rather than true effi ciency gains. Finally, some scholars speculate that the competitive forces leading to improved services and cost savings may erode over time, due to collusion among operators, consolidation of small fi rms into a few big actors, or too few bidders off ering tenders for contracted bus services. This paper reviews the research and debates on privatization in the form of contracting, including its eff ects on the cost-effi ciency and quality of transit provision, and on transit labor.
Background
Contracting is the most common form of privatization in the U.S. It allows the public agency to control planning, route, and scheduling coordination while the private bus companies own, maintain, and operate vehicles, and hire labor (Iseki 2004) . Contracting is theorized to reduce costs compared to purely public transit due to labor cost diff erentials, diseconomies of scale, increased fl exibility of service provision and work rules, and increased competition. Private fi rms, motivated by profi t and competition from other bidders, will seek to lower the cost of service and encourage greater production effi ciency. Labor costs are theoretically lowered through an increased ability to utilize part-time labor, the reduction of overtime and split-shift s, and lower labor costs paid to oft en non-unionized labor (Nicosia 2001; Iseki 2004) . In addition, the private sector, by virtue of fewer bureaucratic constraints, is assumed to be more able to substitute factor inputs to improve production effi ciency, to reduce overtime labor, and to streamline management and maintenance and procurement procedures. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) have observed a cycle of privatization and regulation of bus service within countries. Initially, in the entrepreneurial stage, services are provided entirely by the private sector. Over time, as fi rms consolidate, governments move to regulate fares and grant franchises along routes. With pressure to keep fares low, in the case of rising incomes and increased auto ownership, the profi tability of fi rms declines as they begin to operate on deteriorating capital and begin cutt ing back services. Subsequently, the government moves in to subsidize service and take over failing companies, however subsidies oft en are followed by increased costs, through higher public wages and unionization. Declines in productivity, and subsequently ridership, in turn, lead to calls for re-privatization.
Up until the mid-1960s, bus transit fi rms in the U.S. were primarily privately owned and operated. Privately owned streetcar lines in the early 1920s were aff orded public monopoly status with the rationale that the high initial capital costs associated with rail created a large economy of scale that justifi ed ownership by one public entity (Nicosia 2001) . However, rapid growth in automobile usage beginning in the 1920s and continuing more or less through the 1960s and 1970s (with a short decline due to rationing during World War II) eroded transit mode shares, especially for off -peak trips and weekend excursions and shopping trips. In the United States, as private agencies were taken over by public ones in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the resulting agencies tended to consolidate, leading to larger overhead expenses (Richmond 2001) . In response to the growing fi nancial troubles in the transit industry, a series of bills was passed to come to its aid. In 1964, the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) increased federal involvement in transit, providing grants for public takeovers of failing transit fi rms as well as capital investments, and, in 1974, the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act marked the beginning of a decade of federal funding of transit operating costs.
Operating subsidies rose rapidly under the UMTA Section 5 program, with payments rising, in constant 1984 dollars, from an initial level of approximately $540 million in 1975 to $1 billion by 1978 and to a peak of $1.3 billion in 1980 (Pickrell 1985) . However, as subsidies grew, transit's costs continued to soar faster than infl ation, while at the same time its productivity declined.
1 For example, between 1960 and 1992, annual operating costs rose 161 percent, in constant 1992 dollars (from $6.1 to $15.9 billion); however, while the total number of passenger trips remained relatively constant, operating costs per passenger increased by 176 percent (from $0.70 to $1.93 per trip), in real terms.
Declining transit productivity and cost eff ectiveness have been att ributed to several factors, including subsidies themselves, rising labor and fuel costs, the extension of services to far-reaching, low-density suburbs, overstaffing of transit agencies, high labor costs, stringent work rules, restrictions on the use of part-time labor, and increased utilization of overtime labor (Black 1995; Pickrell 1985; Lave 1991) . Pickrell (1985) found that, between 1974 and 1984, 42 percent of increased operating subsidies were absorbed by higher costs for maintaining existing service while the remaining subsidies went to new services and to fi nance fare reductions. However, during this period ridership only increased by 9 percent with 4.9 billion new annual trips.
Several scholars att ribute policies within federal social and environmental legislation to the declines in transit cost effi ciencies. Lave (1991) argues that the 1974 legislation redirected eff orts away from effi ciency objectives and toward social objectives, such as the revitalization of urban areas and increasing access to aff ordable mobility for the poor and disabled, and led to lower cost effi ciencies. He concludes that these policies led to the expansion of transit services into low-density suburban areas and substantial reduction in fares. Additionally, federal environmental goals encouraged the increase of costly commuter and express bus service to lure drivers out of their automobiles resulting in a patt ern of transit service in which central city services were curtailed and suburban services expanded. Pick-rell (1985) estimates that as a result of suburban expansions, the average frequency, measured as total vehicle miles over total route miles, declined by 25 percent. Infrequent service over longer more dispersed routes with lower ridership levels led to lower productivity numbers. During this period, fare revenues also declined from about 55 percent of operating expenses in 1975 to 39 percent in 1989. fi nd that while productivity declined and costs escalated with public takeovers and increased subsidization of bus transit, riders have also benefi ted from fare decreases and service expansions supported by subsidies. Obeng and Sakano (2000) decompose the eff ects of government subsidies on total factor productivity (TFP) for bus transit for the period 1983 to 1992.
2
They found that subsidies led to a substitution toward fuel and labor inputs and away from capital inputs over the period.
3 Taken together, subsidies, output, and technical-change eff ects decreased TFP by approximately 4 percent per year. They conclude that capital subsidies for buses increase the use of cost-saving technologies, while bus operating subsidies have the opposite eff ect. However, the largest factor leading to lower productivity were scale eff ects, in the form of increased vehicle miles of bus travel, due to the longer distances required to serve growing low-density suburbs. 4 As transit subsidies increased and productivity fell, the era of federal operating subsidies was followed by calls for privatization by the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Bringing a new emphasis on both cost cutt ing and increasing the role of the private sector, the administration passed several bills requiring privatization and the reduction of subsidies, leading a number of transit agencies to begin contracting services. As of 2001, over one third of agencies reporting to the National Transit Database (NTD) contracted for some services, spending approximately $14 billion (Iseki, 2004) .
Section 13(c) of the 1964 UMTA, which was included to allay fears that transit labor unions would lose rights to collective bargaining in the transition from private to public ownership, has become an obstacle for agencies wanting to contract out services to private fi rms. The law prohibits a transit agency from taking any action that will adversely aff ect its public transit union employees. Consequently, contracting has been more att ractive for new or expanded bus services. Most oft en employed in high-defi cit areas, contracting is frequently used in providing services during more expensive peak hours, on long-haul commuter lines, in low-density areas, or for specialized services such as paratransit for the disabled (Morlock, et al. 1971; Teal 1985; Teal and Giuliano 1987; Webster 1988) . Larger agencies tend to contract out only some of their services while small ones tend to contract out all service (Iseki 2004 ).
Studies of service contracting have found cost savings ranging from 10 to 40 percent per unit (e.g., vehicle-mile, vehicle-hour) of contracted service (Teal and Giuliano 1986; Morlok and Viton 1985; Downs 1988; Karlaft is et al. 1997; McCullough et al. 1998; Nicosia, 2001; Iseki 2004 ). However, Sclar (1997) , Teal (1991), and McCullough et al. (1998) found cost increases associated with contracting.
Many studies of contracting have been criticized for methodological shortcomings. McCullough (1998) has cautioned that many studies are too short to provide conclusive information, as they only look at a few years aft er contracting begins. He criticizes the practice of comparing different-sized operators in many studies. In addition, since in most cases contracting fi rms are not randomly assigned, the decision to contract is likely to vary systematically across fi rms and with respect to observed and unobserved factors. For example, more fi scally responsible fi rms that wish to minimize costs, or conversely, less effi cient agencies that have high cost functions may be more likely to contract. Therefore, savings estimates that do not control for the endogeneity of the agency decision to contract may be subject to selection bias.
Privatization has oft en been implemented in an ideological and politically charged atmosphere (Richmond 2001) . As a result, many case studies on contracting are politically motivated, with opposing sides using quantitative methods to justify preconceived ideas (Richmond 2001) . Large diff erences in cost savings estimates can stem from whether the authors used fully or partially allocated costs, measure short-term or long-term eff ects, or include transaction costs such as the administrative costs associated with contracting. Fully allocated methods compare the cost of in-house overhead plus contracted, while partially allocated accounting methods only compare the cost savings of the contracted portion of service. In the case of a public agency contracting out part of its service, cost allocation methods yield diff erent results. Contracting supporters have oft en favored fully allocated modeling while opponents have employed a marginal-cost approach.
Contracting out transit service has been criticized on many grounds. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) argue that cost savings from contracting are sometimes just a transfer between groups instead of a resource savings for the economy, stating, "Lower wage rates reduce budgetary costs but, without productivity increases, do not reduce the labor resources required" (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, 279-80) . Transit agency boards usually abstain from wage negotiating processes and instead rely on private contractors to establish market rates. Richmond (2001) and Kim (2005) note that lower wages may result in lower service quality due to high labor turnover and less experienced drivers. Additionally, changes in companies at the end of a contract period oft en results in drivers losing their jobs or having to start over at the bott om of the wage scale (Richmond 2001 ).
Sclar (2001) questions many of the assumptions underlying standard economic theory as it applies to contracting. He cautions that contracting markets are likely to become oligopolistic or even monopolistic over time, undermining the competitive forces theorized to lead to cost savings. Transit fi rms have an incentive to work together to exclude potential competitors and increase market power and profi ts. In Colorado, for example, where the state legislature mandated a law requiring privatization of 20 percent of Denver's transit services, 18 fi rms, ranging from large bus operators to small taxi cab companies, initially expressed interest in bidding; however, aft er the law was implemented, contracts tended to be awarded to the same few large companies with a higher capacity to write qualifi ed proposals and with the ability to fi nance the required bonding and insurance. These fi rms also had a greater ability than small fi rms to submit very low bids, by assuming losses in the initial years. Sclar further argues that since complex services such as transit require longer term contracts, it may inhibit the ability of public agencies to replace fi rms quickly with competitors if services are not up to par, leading to less real competition. Additionally, the development of relationships between the public agency and the provider may lead to unfair political infl uences.
Problems of principal-agent, adverse selection, and moral hazards can lead to high contract design, monitoring, and enforcement costs that may counteract costs savings (Sclar 2001) . Information asymmetries between the contracting fi rm (the principal) and the public agency (the agent) substantially increase the costs of contract monitoring and enforcement. Adverse selection, in which the more poorly qualifi ed fi rms whose inexperience leads to very low and oft en winning bids, also compromises the quality of service. Adverse selection can increase overall costs due to declines in ridership, increases in accidents, and expenses associated with poor vehicle maintenance. Some public agencies respond to this problem by sett ing a higher bidding price fl oor in order to obtain services from the more qualifi ed fi rms. However, Sclar (2001) notes that this price may equal or exceed that of the public agency, possibly negating the benefi ts of contracting. A moral hazard arises where vehicles are owned by the public agency but operated by the private contractor who has a disincentive to maintain them well. Furthermore, he notes that contractors have litt le incentive to try to increase or maintain the agency's ridership base. However, he does not mention whether public agencies might be able to add provisions for ridership losses in the contract design. The desire for repeat contracts may form incentives to overcome these moral hazards.
Large economies of scale justifying public ownership in transit have oft en been assumed. However, in bus services this assumption may not hold. Sclar (2001) argues that there may be diseconomies of scale for bus transit. Small, publicly-operated bus agencies have been able to achieve similar operating effi ciencies to private operators, and partial contracting tends to be implemented by large agencies with higher cost structures (Richmond, 2001) . Several empirical studies have supported these observations. Berechman (1993) and Cowie and Asenova (1999) found that smaller agencies have increasing returns, mid-sized agencies have constant to decreasing returns, and large agencies have decreasing returns to scale. Viton (1991) found that average operating costs decrease for small, are constant for medium, and increase for large bus agencies.
Empirical Studies on Cost-Effi ciency of Contracting
Several studies have explored the cost effi ciency of contracting. More recent studies have utilized time series and cross-sectional data and increasingly sophisticated methodologies to address issues such as cost allocation, long-term eff ects, agency size, and issues of endogeneity. estimate (using a pooled cross-sectional time-series for 77 transit systems in 1979 and 135 transit systems in 1980) the eff ect of subsidies on the performance and productivity of public transit, including dummy variables for private contractors, operating and fi nancial characteristics, and socioeconomics of the transit service area. They estimate that private management reduced per-hour operating cost by $1.72 (in 1979-1980 dollars) (0.05 signifi cance level); however the authors caution that their results could be biased due to endogeneity issues. Perry and Babitsky (1986) estimated bus system performance as a function of fi ve organizational structure types using multiple regression 5 analysis. They found that publicly owned and operated transit systems were no diff erent from publicly owned and privately operated ones. However, privately owned and operated systems have higher cost effi ciency and higher farebox recovery ratios. One explanation given by the authors for the higher cost-effi ciency of the privately owned and operated systems is that these systems tend to be concentrated in the northeastern U.S., serving a solid ridership base of commuters traveling to strong central business districts, in areas with highly congested freeways and high parking costs. The authors also note that their study did not address the redistributional eff ects of these organizational forms, which are important given the social objectives of mass transit subsidization. McCullough et al. (1998) used NTD data for the period 1989 to 1993 in a cross-sectional time series design to estimate the eff ects on fully allocated operating expense per revenue hour of bus service of three types of contracting: no contracting, partially contracted, and fully contracted services. Although they were not able to control for the endogeneity of the agency decision to contract, they found no evidence that fully contracted services are more cost-effi cient than services operated by public agencies, but they did identify some savings for partial contracting. They reported that vehicle scheduling and labor utilization were the most important determinants of cost-effi ciency. However, private contractors and privately owned bus fi rms may have more ability to adjust vehicle and labor utilization than public agencies. Two more recent studies by Iseki (2004) and Nicosia (2001) control for the endogeneity between the decision to contract and cost effi ciency. Nicosia (2001) utilized the NTD for 319 transit agencies from 1992 to 2000 to model both the decision to contract and short-run operating costs simultaneously using full-information likelihood methods and fi xed eff ects to control for unobservable fi rm heterogeneity. She modeled a short-term cost function 6 and found a 15 to 19 percent operating cost savings for contracted services, with an average savings of $4 million per year for her sample. Nicosia notes that studies (with the exception of McCullough et al. [1998] ) that do not account for endogeneity fi nd more savings, indicating that high-cost fi rms tend to contract and that cost savings appear to come primarily from labor cost savings. Iseki (2004) analyzed 400 agencies for the years 1992 to 2000 using a fully allocated operating cost model. 7 Using a two-stage ordinary least squares and instrumental variables, he controlled for the endogeneity of the decision to contract. He controlled for more political and institutional variables than past studies and estimated the eff ects of various levels (partial versus full contracting) of contracting on cost effi ciency. He found cost savings of 7.8 percent for full contracting and 5.2 percent for partial contracting from an average service cost of $53.06 per vehicle hour. Nicosia (2001) explored how contract design impacts the degree of cost effi ciency savings in contracting. Two main types of transit contracts are utilized frequently in the U.S.: cost plus and fi xed cost. Under cost-plus contracts the public agency reimburses the contractor for all costs that come up and is more fl exible to changing circumstances. With fi xed-cost contracts, fi rms bid based upon their estimates of the cost of providing service. Fares are collected by the public agency and the agency pays the fi rm for the fi xed amount specifi ed initially in the contract. This type of contract is theorized to bett er minimize costs but to off er less fl exibility to the contractor and may result in lower-quality service. A third variation of contract structure is fi xed-cost contracting with incentives. These types of contracts are utilized more frequently in the U.K. and New Zealand than in the U.S. and include incentives for improved quality standards and ridership increases (Shaw 1996) . Finally, with net-cost contracting the operator keeps fare revenue and is given a subsidy. Also known as minimum-subsidy franchising, the public agency covers any revenue shortfall predicted by the fi rm at the time of bidding. Firms face more risk from demand fl uctuations, which may reduce interest in contracts, or competition in the bidding stage, and induce fi rms to add a risk premium to their bid price.
The Eff ects of Contract Design on Cost Effi ciency
Using propensity score methods, Nicosia (2001) found no diff erences in cost-effi ciencies between the cost-plus and fi xed-cost contracts, however, she found that agencies self-select into contracts that are more effi cient or bett er suited to their circumstances. She found that cost-plus contracts are more oft en utilized by agencies with more contracting experience and greater asset specifi city, 8 while fi xed-cost contracts are used more frequently by larger agencies or those with more bargaining power relative to the contractor.
Quality of Service and Contracting
The quality of transit services is important to att racting ridership. Studies of Toronto and Boston found elasticity of demand of 0.4 for quality 9 while that for fare was lower, ranging between -0.2 and -0. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) found several negative impacts of contracting on service quality in London, particularly during transition periods. Coordination and integration of services declined with contracting.
Nicosia (2001) examined the eff ects of contracting on quality of service in the U.S., measured by vehicle miles and capacity, number of collisions, and road calls. Controlling for the endogeneity 11 between service quality and the decision to contract, she estimated the parameters in the decision to contract conditional on bargaining power, transaction cost, and economic and political variables. Using panel data to control for exogenous changes in demand over time, she found a 36 percent increase in recalls, a 76 percent increase in collisions, and a 16 percent decrease in vehicle-miles. As a consequence, ridership also decreased by at least 10 percent. These results are consistent with case studies that found high turnover and low-skilled drivers an issue in some areas (Richmond 2001) . However, vehicle-miles are a coarse measure of quality. Bett er measures might be vehicle-miles per route-mile of service (an indicator of frequency) or passenger-miles per vehicle hour (a measure of speed). Alternative measures of quality could include reliability, on-board safety, information for customers, 12 comfort, and convenience; however, more data on these factors are needed (TCRP 2004) .
Labor Impacts
Transit is a labor intensive industry, with labor comprising approximately 70 percent of total operating costs (Kim 2005) . While the proponents of contracting argue that labor costs are excessive as a result of public operation, critics of contracting charge that the cost savings of contracting come primarily at the expense of reductions in wages, labor productivity, and service quality. High labor costs have been att ributed by some scholars to restrictive work rules limiting the hiring of part-time labor or cross-utilization of labor among various job functions, for example drivers performing maintenance tasks or vice versa. In addition, union contracts oft en require workers to be paid for eight-hour shift s plus split-shift diff erentials, even though, due to declines in off -peak transit demand, many workers are idle during the off -peak. So while the typical number of hours spent driving is between 4 to 5 hours, workers are usually paid for 12 hours to cover the morning and aft ernoon peak periods for which part-time drivers cannot be hired.
Recent work by Kim (2005) examined the eff ects of contracting on transit labor and transit productivity. The study consisted of 12 transit agencies that report to the National Transit Database, 13 including fi ve private contractors, the in-house portion of service by public agencies that contract out some service to these fi ve contractors, and four public agencies that were matched as comparison groups based on operating characteristics. Because limited access to labor data from private companies (those not receiving federal subsidies and therefore not reporting to the NTD) restricted the sample size available for the study, the ability to generalize the results may also be limited. Kim's (2005) research fi ndings suggest that drivers working for private transit fi rms receive substantially lower wages, have fewer paid days off , receive slower seniority increases, and have lower wage ceilings. Private industry drivers in the sample made between 34 and 38 percent lower wages than public drivers, indicating that most of the savings of contracting come from labor cost diff erentials. They earned approximately $10 to $11 per hour (or $24,000 annual earnings), while public drivers received $16 to $18 per hour (or $36,500 annually). In addition, wages paid by the private contractors in the sample increased more slowly and lagged behind infl ation over the study period (1996 to 2001) . For example, in Houston, drivers start at $9.27 an hour and can earn up to $11.29 with fi ve years' experience. Kim (2005) hypothesizes that lower wage rates in the private sector result in drivers working longer hours to make ends meet. She states, "A privately hired driver worked on average 100 to 200 hours more per year than a public driver in order to compensate for lower regular wages, but still did not always achieve the same annual earnings as his public counterpart" (Kim 2005, 165) . Additionally, private drivers have very few paid days of leave, while public drivers receive three times more paid absences than public drivers. Specifi cally, public drivers receive approximately 52 paid days off while private drivers receive 15 days off per year. Private opera-tors hired fewer part-time drivers than public operators in the sample (2 percent versus 11 percent, on average), a surprising fi nding given the degree of peaking in transit. Kim (2005) speculates that lower wages paid by the private sector may result in a lower willingness to work part-time, especially given that public agencies off er signifi cantly higher wages and benefi ts for part-time work in the same metropolitan areas. Finally, payments associated with union work rules, a component of spending considered ineffi cient, declined over time for public agencies contracting out a portion of their service. According to Kim (2005) , this fi nding may indicate that labor had granted concessions under the threat of contracting.
14 Labor cost savings from contracting came with several tradeoff s. Lower wages and job security were associated with lower service quality, less effi cient labor utilization, higher labor turnover, less-experienced drivers, increased absenteeism, and higher accident rates. Higher accident rates, in turn, were associated with increased insurance, training, overtime, and work-rules related costs. Lower labor costs were accompanied by less effi cient labor utilization and higher costs due to less qualifi ed and less productive labor. Additionally, although the total operating costs for private operators were lower than those for public operators ($50 versus $84 per revenue vehicle hour), the costs of non-labor inputs, such as fuel, maintenance, casualty, liability, and administration were higher for private operators. Surprisingly, private operators also paid signifi cantly more for non-operating labor time, including stand-by time, driver training, union functions, run selection, and accident reporting, which were the most costly components of work rules payments. Kim (2005) computes the savings that could hypothetically be transferred to labor if private operators were more effi cient in three areas (overtime, non-operating time, and insurance), fi nding that wages could increase on average by $2.22 per hour, bringing the average private wage to $12.95 per hour, which remains lower than the average public wage of $17.30 per hour. Notably, some public agencies were able to achieve similar cost-effi ciencies while still paying wages and benefi ts substantially above those of the private sector. For example, VIA San Antonio, a public operator in Texas, had operating costs of $52 per revenue vehicle hour (RVH) below that of First (DART), a private operator with similar operating conditions, whose costs were $64 per RVH. However, VIA drivers received roughly $3 more per hour than First (DART) drivers and received $1,500 more in benefi ts. VIA also had a higher utilization rate of part-time labor and fewer payments due to work rules as well as higher vehicle fuel and maintenance effi ciencies. Given these fi ndings, Kim (2005) calls for increased examination of alternative methods to contracting for improving transit operation and organizational effi ciency as well as wage standards set by public agencies.
Similarly, Sclar (2001) argues that in cases where transaction costs of contracting exceed savings, those agencies would be bett er off by restructuring their operations to improve effi ciency. He emphasizes that organizational changes require a public agency leadership that is willing to listen to and involve workers in effi ciency improving reforms. For example, he cites the costs savings brought by organizational changes in Indianapolis Fleet Services, a public agency that maintained the city's vehicle fl eet, under the threat of contracting. Under the pressure to contract, the agency's leadership successfully involved public workers in brainstorming and implementing several cost savings and effi ciency improving reforms without wage reductions. Changes implemented were reportedly ones that workers had been requesting for years with no response previously from management. Using this example, Sclar (2001) contends that the costs of bett er management of public workers may be less than those of managing private contractors. This assertion raises the question of what kinds of institutional changes are needed to create the eff ective incentives for management and workers to collaborate toward effi ciency and improvements in quality.
Summary and Conclusions
Escalating costs, declining productivity, and constraints on funding for transit have spurred many public transit agencies to return to privatization. Early studies on contracting of fi xed bus routes in the U.S. have found cost savings from contracting that range from 10 to 40 percent (Iseki 2004) . However, many of those studies had methodological issues that brought into question the accuracy of their results. More recent studies by Nicosia (2001) and Iseki (2004) were able to address many of these issues, in particular that of endogeneity between costs and the decision to contract. Nicosia's (2001) results indicate that contracting can save between 15 and 19 percent, while Iseki (2004) fi nds lower savings, of 8 percent for full contracting and 5 percent for partial contracting. However, these costs savings seem to come at the price of service quality and safety (Nicosia 2001) and reductions in driver compensation levels without increases in labor productivity (Kim 2005) . Furthermore, lower wages and higher turnover rates associated with contracting may be in turn related to the observed increase in accidents and lower quality transit service by Nicosia (2001) .
More research is needed on how contracting impacts the quality of transit service, such as on-time performance, routing, passenger comfort and satisfaction, and frequency, as well as longer-term impacts of contracting on labor. This work would require bett er survey data related to labor and service quality for private contractors not included in the NTD. Contract design and bidding requirements were not found to signifi cantly aff ect cost-effi ciency but may have important, but yet to be identifi ed, implications for the quality of service and fare levels. In this vein, research is needed to address how the details of contract design, such as provisions for labor standards or incentives for maintaining or even increasing ridership, might impact the quality and effi ciency of service.
Additionally, research by both Kim (2005) and McCullough et al. (1998) highlights that contracting and wage reductions are not the only means of increasing cost effi ciency within transit operations. Other operational changes could include improving labor-utilization, fuel, and maintenance effi ciencies through route interlining and optimization, or decreasing nonrevenue vehicle operating hours by optimizing locations of maintenance and storage facilities relative to routes (Kim 2005; McCullough et al. 1998; Iseki 2004 ). These methods might be writt en in contracts or transit agencies could negotiate with unions to reduce ineffi cient work rules such as restrictions on part-time workers, split shift s, and limited diff erentiation of wage rates by seniority levels (Kim 2005) .
To this end, more research is needed on what institutional and policy changes, other than the threat of contracting, could foster incentives to improve service cost effi ciency and quality. For example, some scholars have proposed that smaller transit zones operated by public agencies achieve similar cost savings through reductions in overhead costs, while maintaining higher wages and a more stable workforce (Richmond 2001 ).
The research fi ndings reviewed here seem to indicate that responsible and fair labor practices in contracting transit are integral to maintaining high service quality and safety. However, in determining the appropriate labor policies, the social objectives of increasing mobility for all segments of society, especially those who are unable or cannot aff ord to drive, and reducing environmental externalities of transportation should be kept in focus. That is, to the extent that driver wages and benefi ts far exceed the market rate for similar skills and educational att ainment levels, or that ineffi cient work rules signifi cantly constrict the supply of transit, bus riders, who are oft en very low-income, may be paying for these ineffi cient labor practices with their mobility. Instead, wage rates and benefi t packages should be set to att ract and retain well-trained and qualifi ed drivers, while negotiating work rules that foster effi cient, high-quality transit that meets the needs of both bus riders and transit labor and also furthers environmental objectives. Additionally, income inequality and poverty are important issues that might be more eff ectively addressed on a wider scale using policy measures that increase access to job training and higher education opportunities.
Finally, the research reviewed here shows that decline in transit productivity over time has not been due solely to subsidies, high labor costs, and ineffi cient work rules, but to as a complex combination of factors. The continued growth in auto ownership complemented by low-density, autooriented urban growth patt erns have continued to erode transit ridership and extend the distances routes must cover, substantially reducing the cost eff ectiveness of transit. Subsidies and investments in other modes of transportation, such as automobile infrastructure, free parking, and gasoline prices that do not refl ect environmental externalities, have exacerbated this trend and put transit at a further disadvantage (Litman 2005) . Therefore, addressing other ineffi ciencies in the passenger transportation sector at a broader level should also be considered as a means of improving transit effi ciency. For example, where traffi c congestion results in slower bus speeds, investments in Bus Rapid Transit technologies 15 might have higher payoff s in terms of cost effi ciency relative to transit contracting, provided concurrent investments in appropriate and supportive land uses are made. In lower-density environments, given the high cost of fi xed-route bus service, it may be more cost eff ective to provide mobility for the poor through subsidized shared taxis, legalized privately owned paratransit services, or even subsidized car ownership (O'Regan and Quigley 1998; Taylor and Ong 1995; Wachs 1997) . More research comparing alternatives to contracting to increase operating effi ciency is needed.
In conclusion, while contracting appears to have the potential to substantially reduce costs, the tradeoff s involved may be considerable, and the broader social objectives of transit need to be kept in mind. More research is needed on possible ways to reduce these tradeoff s, such as bett er contract design, quality and safety standards, and contract monitoring. Various alternatives to contracting, such as broader organizational changes or addressing larger transportation system ineffi ciencies, and their tradeoff s, should be weighed in a broader policy context. Lastly, where contracting is utilized, it should be accompanied by appropriate and enforceable service quality standards and labor practices which support these standards. 
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